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The Food for Peace program has saved millions of lives 
around the world for more than a half century and has 
been perhaps the most powerful and visible symbol of 
American generosity to those in need. The question is not 
whether the program has been successful in saving lives, 
but whether it can be improved to make it more effective, 
more efficient, and faster, so that more lives can be saved?  
Since 2003, the Food for 
Peace program has spent 
49% of its budget on trans-
portation and handling costs 
and only 40% on actual com-
modities1. In other words, in 
the last ten years, the US gov-
ernment, through the Food 
for Peace program, has spent 
more on transporting, stor-
ing, and distributing the food 
to other regions of the world 
than on the food itself.  
THEN AND NOW  
Fifty years ago the bulk of 
the food went to Asia and the 
subcontinent and was used 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The USAID Food for Peace 
program has been very 
effective, but it can be made 
even better. 
 
Allowing more local and 
regional procurement would:  
 Make the current food aid 
program more cost effective 
 Greatly shorten delivery 
times 
 Benefit local economies in 
desperate need of an 
economic boost after a 
humanitarian crisis. 
 
2 in stable countries in long term development 
programs. Today most of it goes to sub-Sahara 
Africa and is used to fight hunger in famines 
during civil wars, often in failed states. While 
the original program was provided govern-
ment-to-government, now nearly all goes 
through non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the Red Cross movement, and the 
UN’s World Food Program (WFP). The origi-
nal program disposed of surplus US grain 
owned by the federal government. Today US 
food aid is bought on private US agricultural 
markets. Once the food has been received, 
usually by the WFP or NGOs, either the food is 
distributed to feed the hungry or it is sold in 
the local markets for local currency that is 
used by the NGOs for other development pro-
jects.  
LOCAL AND REGIONAL PROCUREMENT 
Allowing more local and regional procure-
ment (LRP), the practice where food is bought 
locally rather than purchased in the United 
States and then shipped, would make the cur-
rent food aid program more cost effective and 
greatly shorten delivery times. Studies done 
by the General Accounting Office (GAO)2,3 and 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA)4 con-
firm that for nearly every type of commodity, 
the cost of procuring it in the United States 
and transporting it is higher than purchasing 
the commodity locally. The US Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID) estimates 
that local and regional food procurements 
cost 20%-50% less and arrive 11-14 weeks 
sooner than US exported food. As many as two 
million more people could receive food aid at 
the same cost if the food aid reforms in the 
proposed FY 2015 budget were passed.5 Per-
haps more importantly, in an emergency situ-
ation where men, women, and children are in 
desperate need of food aid, being able to get 
them the food they need to survive weeks ear-
lier would be immensely beneficial.  
Shipments from the United States to ports on 
the other side of the world are subject to 
risks. For example, the food aid warehouses in 
Texas were nearly destroyed during Hurri-
cane Katrina, pirates off the coast of Somalia 
captured a food aid ship, and one shipment of 
food aid to North Korea sank in a storm. The 
current system is dependent on a long and 
complex logistics chain that is subject to de-
lays. In dire conditions procuring food closer 
to its need could save many lives. 
One of the major factors leading to wide-
spread deaths in famines is the sharp rise in 
food prices in local markets over short peri-
ods of time usually after a major crop failure. 
These dramatic price increases mean only the 
wealthy can afford to buy food to survive the 
crisis. In Somalia in 1991, the price of grain 
increased between 700-1200% in less than a 
year causing a famine which killed 250,000 
people. Auctioning food aid locally to reduce 
prices to a more normal level, so that more 
people can afford to buy food in the markets, 
can be a very useful tool. Food aid reforms 
should not preclude market interventions to 
Local and regional 
food procurements 
cost 20%-50% less 
and arrive 11-14 
weeks sooner 
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stabilize food prices during famines. Where a 
drought covers a large geographic area in 
which most crops have failed, local purchase 
might be unwise because it would drive up 
food prices. In this case food, should be im-
ported far from the crisis. The decision on 
when to purchase locally versus sourcing food 
in the United States should be made in USAID 
by Food for Peace officers, not by law or by 
interest group pressure in the United States.  
A great deal of research has been done to 
show the negative long term effects of inject-
ing large amounts of free or inexpensive food 
aid into local markets under non-crisis cir-
cumstances. When I was Administrator of 
USAID, we launched several programs to try 
and cut down on opium production in Afghan-
istan by creating alternate sources of liveli-
hoods for farmers. In the summer of 2001, 
and we instituted an improved wheat seed 
program to encourage wheat production. 
However, things did not go as planned. An un-
expectedly good rainy season occurred com-
bined with the higher yielding wheat resulted 
in local farmers producing far more wheat 
than expected. Wheat prices dropped dramat-
ically. Not surprisingly, many Afghan farmers 
returned to poppy farming for opium produc-
tion. If we could have used the Title II PLO 
480 appropriation (the Food for Peace pro-
gram funds) to purchase food locally and 
bought up the surplus rather than importing 
more US food aid, we could have discouraged 
opium production by making wheat farming 
more attractive as an alternate source of in-
come. We could not do that because existing 
law would not allow it. 
In many cases, countries who have been hit by 
natural disaster have specifically asked us not 
to send them food, and yet we ignored them. 
After the 2004 tsunami hit Aceh, Indonesia, 
the Indonesian foreign minister asked the 
world to not send rice, because there was 
plenty of food in Indonesia we could have 
bought locally. But we did not have the flexi-
bility in our food aid program to do that. After 
the Haiti earthquake in 2010, the president of 
Haiti asked the world to not send food out of 
concern it would hurt local rice production. 
We did anyway, and local rice farmers were 
damaged. 
We have considerable evidence that purchas-
ing food locally provides additional support to 
local farmers and helps boost the local econo-
my. In one particular article looking at the 
WFPs local purchase program in Uganda, the 
author found numerous favorable secondary 
effects of purchasing the food locally, includ-
ing improved farmer knowledge of local mar-
kets, improved reliability of the markets, a 
lack of a middle man leading to higher prices 
for the farmers, and improved housing and 
cash income.6 
CONCLUSIONS 
With such strong evidence pointing out the 
negatives of the current food aid system, why 
is there any opposition to these reforms? The 
answer is simple—special interest groups like 
agribusiness, labor unions, and maritime in-
terests oppose them. Food aid is, first and 
Purchasing food locally 
provides additional 
support to local farmers 
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foremost, an emergency response tool, not a 
subsidy for domestic economic interests. As 
Dr. Norman Borlaug and I argued back in 
2008 when the Bush administration was 
pushing for reform,7 food aid accounts for less 
than 1% of US agricultural exports, and even 
less of net farm income. The impact these re-
forms would have on US agricultural indus-
tries would be negligible. Existing system pol-
icies are not in the best interest of American 
food aid, the American taxpayer, or, most im-
portantly, the millions who rely on food aid to 
help them survive humanitarian crises. 
There should be no question of the im-
portance of these reforms. President Bush 
pushed strongly for them during my tenure in 
USAID because the evidence showed that they 
were greatly needed. President Obama is do-
ing the same now because he does as well. 
Since that time, more and more evidence has 
shown that purchasing food aid locally is fast-
er, more cost-efficient, and can have greater 
beneficial effects on local economies in des-
perate need of an economic boost after a hu-
manitarian crisis.  
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